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All known human societies have maintained social order by enforcing compliance with 
social norms. The biological mechanisms underlying norm compliance are, however, 
hardly understood. We show that the right lateral prefrontal cortex is involved in both 
voluntary and sanction-induced norm compliance. Both types of compliance could be 
changed by varying neural excitability of this brain region with transcranial direct current 
stimulation, but they were affected in opposite ways, suggesting that the stimulated region 
plays a fundamentally different role in voluntary and sanction-based compliance. Brain 
stimulation had a particularly strong effect for compliance based on socially-constituted 
sanctions, while it left beliefs about what the norm prescribes and about subjectively 
expected sanctions unaffected. Our findings suggest that rLPFC activity is a key biological 
prerequisite for an evolutionarily and socially important aspect of human behavior.  
 
 
One Sentence Summary:  
Human compliance with social norms can be increased or decreased by appropriately stimulating 
the right lateral prefrontal cortex non-invasively with electrical currents. 
 
 Human societies depend crucially on social norms that specify the range of permissible actions 
for a given situation. Social norms range from the mundane (e.g., dress codes, table etiquette) to 
the profound (e.g., collective action, bilateral exchange, law obedience). They are considered a 
hallmark of human civilization because no other known species regulates social interactions to 
the same degrees by norms (1-3). The potential of norms to guide collective behavior can break 
down if norm violations are not sanctioned, because humans tend to follow prevailing norms 
conditional on observing others’ compliance (4). All known human societies have therefore 
enforced norm compliance by threatening norm violators with punishment, both officially via 
legal codes and institutions, and informally in the context of private sanctions through peers (5, 
6). The importance of credible sanctioning threats for maintaining norm compliance is well 
established by ethnographic evidence (1, 2), evolutionary theory (1, 3), and laboratory 
experiments (5, 6). 
It has been proposed that the human brain may have developed neural processes that 
support norm enforcement by generating appropriate behavioral responses to social punishment 
threats (7-10). However, neuroscience studies on social norms have mostly focused on the neural 
basis of punishing others (11-14), whereas evidence for neural circuitry underlying sanction-
induced compliance with norms is scarce. In mature adults, a brain network involving an area in 
the right lateral prefrontal cortex (rLPFC) is activated during norm-compliant behavior triggered 
by social punishment threats (10). However, it is not possible to conclude from correlative fMRI 
findings that norm compliance depends causally on neural activity in the rLPFC (15). 
Establishing such a causal dependence is crucial for our understanding of how social norm 
compliance develops in the context of brain maturation (16) and how it is pathologically altered 
and therapeutically amenable in the context of brain disorders (9).  
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 We employed transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) (17) to examine whether 
social norm compliance depends causally on neural processing in the previously-identified 
rLPFC region (10). Participants engaged via computer terminals in anonymous social 
interactions that had real financial consequences. In every round, participants (“Player A”) 
received an amount of Money Units (MUs) and decided how much of it to transfer to a randomly 
assigned anonymous opponent (“Player B”). In baseline rounds, this transfer was implemented, 
whereas in punishment rounds, Player B could respond to the transfer by reducing Player A’s 
MUs (Fig. 1, Fig. S1, Supporting Online Material, SOM, (18)). In Western Cultures, a fairness 
norm (19-21) prescribes to split the “cake” of MUs equally between both players. This conflicts 
with Player A’s self-interest motive to keep as many MUs as possible. In baseline rounds, Player 
A thus typically transfers only around 10% - 25% of the MUs. In contrast, when a sanctioning 
threat is present, Player A largely obeys the fairness norm and transfers around 40% - 50% of the 
MUs (10, 20). The transfer difference between punishment and baseline rounds thus indexes 
sanction-induced norm compliance, i.e., the degree to which the sanction threat induces Player A 
to change her transfer from the level of voluntary norm-compliance as measured in baseline 
rounds. 
Individual differences in sanction-induced norm compliance correlate with fMRI-
measured activity in the rLPFC (10). Based on this finding and the rLPFC’s general role in the 
control of behavior (22, 23), it has been proposed that the rLPFC may weigh fair versus selfish 
responses specifically when punishment threats are present (8, 10). To provide causal evidence 
for this hypothesis, we first identified the specific rLPFC region described in (10) using MR-
scans of 63 female participants; we then experimentally altered neural excitability in this brain 
area during behavioral performance in a double-blind, placebo-controlled tDCS design (SOM, 
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 Fig. S2). tDCS can both increase or decrease neural excitability in the stimulated region, 
depending on the polarity of the current flow (17). We thus randomly sorted participants into 
three stimulation groups where neural excitability in the rLPFC was enhanced with anodal tDCS, 
reduced with cathodal tDCS, or left unaltered by sham/placebo tDCS as control for possible non-
neural effects of stimulation (see SOM). Such non-neural effects did not differ between the 
groups (see SOM) and therefore could not account for performance in the norm-compliance 
paradigm.  
Participants were sensitive to the punishment threat and transferred more money in 
punishment than in baseline rounds (mean transfer difference 29.44 MUs; p < 0.001, GLS 
regression). However, in line with our hypothesis, the two active brain stimulation conditions 
changed sanction-induced norm compliance in opposite ways relative to the sham condition (Fig. 
2A, Table S2). Anodal tDCS increased the transfer difference by 33.5% (GLS regression, p < 
0.001) whereas cathodal tDCS decreased the transfer difference by 22.7% (p < 0.001). 
Do these effects reflect changes in altruistic behavior, with increased (decreased) 
monetary transfers regardless of punishment threats? This interpretation is refuted by the data on 
voluntary norm-compliance in baseline rounds (Fig. 2B, Table S3). Voluntary transfers were 
actually decreased (GLS regression, p < 0.001) during anodal tDCS and increased (p < 0.01) 
during cathodal tDCS, relative to the sham condition. This not only confirms that tDCS affected 
subjects’ response to the punishment threat but that these tDCS effects on sanction-induced 
compliance were actually stronger than the opposite effects on voluntary compliance: If tDCS 
had not affected sanction-induced compliance then overall transfers in punishment rounds – 
which are based on voluntary plus sanction-induced compliance – should also be lower after 
anodal and higher after cathodal stimulation. However, overall transfers in punishment rounds 
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 were in fact higher (GLS regression, p < 0.05) during anodal tDCS and lower (p < 0.001) during 
cathodal tDCS than in the sham condition (Fig. S3).  
Which task-related psychological mechanisms may have contributed to the tDCS effect? 
To respond appropriately, participants need to know the fairness norm and form appropriate 
beliefs about Player B’s reactions. We measured (i) the participants’ perceived fairness, (ii) the 
anger they expected the opponent to feel, and (iii) the punishment they expected at different 
transfer levels (Fig. 3). All participants were clearly aware of the fairness norm and rated higher 
transfers as significantly fairer (ANOVA, F(2,60) = 84.88, p < 0.001), less likely to cause anger 
in the opponent (F(2,60)=218.96, p < 0.001), and leading to lower punishment (F(2,60) = 82.69, 
p < 0.001). Importantly, the type of brain stimulation did not affect participants’ beliefs, neither 
on average (all F(2,60) < 0.94, all p > 0.39) nor in their change across different transfer levels 
(all F(2,60) < 0.55, all p > 0.74). 
Our findings do not yet show that the stimulated rLPFC region implements specifically 
social aspects of behavioral control. In particular, behavior in punishment rounds requires risk 
taking and trading off higher transfers with a lower risk of sanction. We therefore repeated the 
experiment in a sample of 59 new female volunteers who took the identical decisions as before, 
but now played against a computer pre-programmed to respond in the same way as a human 
opponent in punishment rounds (see SOM). In this “non-social context”, participants were also 
sensitive to punishment threats (Fig. S4A) but the effects of tDCS on sanction-induced transfers 
were significantly weaker than during interactions with human opponents (Fig. 4A and Table 
S3). This held for both increases in sanction-induced transfers due to anodal tDCS (GLS 
regression, p = 0.009) and decreases due to cathodal tDCS (p = 0.001, GLS regression). In 
baseline rounds of the non-social context – where no social norm prescribes sharing MUs with 
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 the computer – participants hardly transferred any MUs (Fig. S4B). Such (possibly erroneous) 
voluntary transfers to the computer were therefore also less affected by tDCS than norm-related 
voluntary transfers to human opponents (Fig. 4B; GLS regression, p < 0.05 for anodal tDCS and 
p < 0.001 for cathodal tDCS). 
Social punishment is thought to have played an important role for the evolution of human 
social behavior and cooperation (1-3). Our results show that the influence of punishment threats 
on human social norm compliance depends causally on neural activity in the rLPFC. This 
suggests a neural mechanism involving the rLPFC that aligns behavior with social norms when 
punishment is possible. The more pronounced involvement of this mechanism for genuinely 
social punishments concurs with suggestions that during human brain evolution, the steep 
increase in the complexity of social interactions may have shaped specific neural processes for 
social behavior (8, 24). That tDCS affected sanction-induced and voluntary norm compliance in 
opposite ways suggests that these two forms of norm compliance involve distinct neural circuits; 
in particular, the rLPFC seems to play a fundamentally different role in voluntary and sanction-
based norm compliance.  
Our finding that rLPFC stimulation did not affect awareness of the fairness norm and 
expected sanctions suggests that the rLPFC process necessary for norm-compliant behavior is 
dissociated from neural mechanisms enabling humans to anticipate sanctions for norm violations 
and to distinguish “right” from “wrong”. The rLPFC mechanism necessary for norm-compliance 
is probably not restricted to neural activity within this brain area, given that prefrontal cortex is 
involved in many aspects of behavioral control (23) and that brain stimulation can affect areas 
interconnected with the stimulation site (25). The anatomical connectivity (26) and context-
dependent functions of prefrontal cortex (27) make it more likely that the stimulated rLPFC area 
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 integrates and coordinates activity in a network of brain regions triggered by the need for 
considering social punishments during action control (8).  
Brain stimulation studies in humans have so far mostly shown unidirectional, 
maladaptive effects on decision making, rendering participants more impulsive (28), selfish (29), 
or cognitively biased (30). Such interventions may therefore be of limited practical use in applied 
settings. Our finding that changes in the neural excitability of rLPFC can enhance voluntary and 
sanction-induced social norm compliance may be of relevance because non-compliance with 
social norms constitutes a major problem in psychiatric (41) and neurological (31, 32) disorders, 
during abnormal development in adolescence (33), and in adults in the form of criminal activity 
(9). However, the opposite influence of brain stimulation on voluntary and sanction-induced 
norm compliance also suggests that increasing one type of norm compliance with brain 
stimulation may come at the cost of decreasing the other type.  
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 Figure Captions: 
 
Fig. 1. Economic game used to measure social norm compliance. In each round, both players 
receive 25 money units (MUs). Player A is given an additional 100 MUs that she can share with 
Player B by sending a transfer X (in multiples of 10 MUs). All experimental MUs are exchanged 
into real money at the end of the experiment. Two types of rounds are presented in random order. 
(A) Baseline round: Transfer X is implemented as proposed, measuring Player A’s voluntary 
norm compliance. (B) Punishment round: Player B can either accept X (blue font) or invest Y 
MUs from her initial endowment to punish Player A (red font). Y can be any integer between 0 
and 25, reducing A’s payoff by 5*Y MUs. Player A is aware of this possible sanction; any 
increase in transfers for punishment relative to baseline rounds therefore measures sanction-
induced norm compliance.  
 
Fig. 2. rLPFC stimulation changes sanction-induced and voluntary norm compliance. (A) 
Sanction-induced norm-compliance: Average (+/- s.e.m.) transfer difference for punishment 
rounds minus baseline rounds. Higher values indicate that the punishment threat led to a larger 
adjustment of transfers towards the fairness norm of an equal split. (B) Voluntary norm 
compliance: Average (+/- s.e.m.) transfers for baseline rounds. All values determined with 
regression in eq.1 (SOM) ; * p < 0.05. 
 
Fig. 3 rLPFC stimulation does not affect participants’ beliefs about the fairness of different 
transfers and about Player B’s anticipated anger and expected punishment. (A) Average rating of 
perceived fairness for different transfer levels (scale from 1/”very unfair” to 4/”very fair”). (B) 
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 Average rating of anticipated anger felt by Player B for different transfer levels (scale from 
1/”not angry at all” to 4/”very angry”). (C) Average expected payoff reduction resulting from 
B’s punishment. Error bars represent s.e.m. 
 
Fig. 4. rLPFC stimulation effects are stronger during social interactions. (A) tDCS effects on 
sanction-induced norm compliance during interactions with a human (Social Context) or a 
computer opponent (Non-social Context). Bars depict average changes in transfer difference for 
anodal and cathodal tDCS relative to the sham condition. (B) tDCS-related changes of voluntary 
transfers in baseline rounds. Bars represent average changes for anodal and cathodal tDCS 
relative to the sham condition. All values determined with regression in eq. 2 (SOM); * p < 0.05. 
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Materials and Methods 
 
Participants and Procedure 
To minimize the variance in norm compliance due to gender, only female undergraduate students 
at the University of Zurich participated in our study. The social experiment comprised 77 
participants (mean age 22 +/- 0.4 [SEM] years, Range = 18 – 32 years) and the non-social 
experiment 64 participants (mean age 22 +/- 0.3 [SEM] years, Range = 18 – 32 years). For each 
experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups that differed only with 
respect to the type of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) they received: anodal, sham, 
or cathodal; see the section “tDCS” and Table S1 further below for details. Participants in the 
three groups were well matched with respect to socioeconomic and personality variables; see the 
section “Analysis and Results” further below. Participants gave informed consent prior to the 
study. All experimental procedures were approved by the local ethics committee. 
Testing was always performed in groups of 12 participants, except when some of the 
invited participants did not show up. However, in any case, the group of participants was 
randomly and evenly assigned to the three stimulation conditions. The experiment was 
conducted in the computerized group room of the Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems 
research (SNS-Lab). The group room comprises 14 identical computer workstations that are 
interconnected and shielded in view from one another, making it possible to conduct studies with 
anonymous, fully randomized social interactions (see Fig. S2). A multi-channel tDCS stimulator 
was used to simultaneously stimulate each of the 12 participants with anodal, sham or cathodal 
tDCS. Assignment to one of the three tDCS groups was performed in a double-blind fashion, 
with the participants and the experimenter who conducted the experiment not knowing which 
seats received active or sham stimulation. This group testing of participants thus controlled for 
unspecific effects, such as order, experimenter, and time of day effects that may potentially 
confound serial testing regimes.  
 
Experimental Paradigm and Measures 
Two weeks prior to the experiment, participants completed an online questionnaire containing 
several personality questionnaires measuring subjects’ degree of Machiavellism (Mach IV scale), 
their risk-taking attitudes (DOSPERT scale) anxiety (STAI scale), and empathy (IRI scale). On 
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the day of testing, social norm compliance was measured using an experimental paradigm that 
closely follows the procedure used in a previous fMRI study (10). In this paradigm, participants 
repeatedly take the role of Player A and are randomly paired in every round with an anonymous 
player B. In every round both players receive an initial endowment of 25 money units (MUs). In 
addition, player A receives another 100 MUs that she can share with Player B as he likes. The 
sharing decision takes the form of a proposed transfer X from Player A to Player B and X can be 
any integer in steps of 10 between 0 and 100 (e.g., 0, 10, 20, etc., until 100). This decision is 
implemented by means of a visual analog scale and a computer mouse (see Fig. S1). In baseline 
roounds (see Fig. 1A in the main paper), player A proposes a transfer X which is always 
implemented as proposed. In punishment rounds (see Fig. 1B in the paper), by contrast, Player B 
has the option to use her initial endowment of 25 MUs to punish player A after she has observed 
the proposed transfer. In particular, for every MU that B invests into punishment player A’s 
earnings are reduced by 5 MUs. This means, for example, that if player A transfers nothing to B 
such that after the transfer decision A has 125 MUs and B has 25 MUs, B can reduce A’s earning 
to zero by investing the whole initial endowment into the punishment of A. During the 
experiment, each participant faced control trials and punishment trials in a random order, with 
the prevailing trial type indicated at the beginning of each round. In total player A completed 12 
rounds in the baseline and 12 rounds in the punishment condition; in each round player A was 
matched with a randomly selected anonymous interaction partner.  
The behavioral experiment described above took place in two separate contexts involving 
different groups of participants (see section “Participants and Procedures” above) – the social 
context and the non-social context. In the social context, Player A faced a different human 
interaction partner in every round. In punishment rounds of the social context, the human partner 
had the opportunity to punish Player A whenever she saw fit, for example, for unfairly low 
transfer levels. In contrast, in the non-social context, Player A was confronted with a pre-
programmed computer. In punishment rounds of the non-social context the computer “punished” 
low transfer levels with exactly the same probability and magnitudes with which human partners 
punished low transfers in the social context.  
At the beginning of each round the players were informed whether the upcoming trial 
belonged to the baseline or the punishment condition; this means that Player A always knew 
whether she faced a punishment threat or not. In baseline rounds, transfers therefore indicate 
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Player A’s level of voluntary compliance with the fairness norm of an equal split. By contrast, 
Player A’s sanction-induced norm compliance can be measured by the difference in transfer 
levels between punishment and baseline rounds, as this index quantifies how much the 
punishment threat makes Player A deviate from her level of voluntary norm compliance. 
Given that the aim of this experiment was to test how tDCS affects Player A’s norm 
compliance, players B were not physically present during the stimulation sessions but gave their 
responses in a pilot session recorded beforehand. However, all Players B agreed that their 
responses could be reused in other sessions (see also (10)). In the social context, each player A 
faced the decisions of a randomly selected player B and thus interacted with a real human 
opponent. All decisions were fully incentive compatible, as the MUs gained by the participants 
were transformed to Swiss Francs after the experiment according to a predefined conversion rate 
(1 MU = 0.015 CHF). These earnings were paid out on top of the base pay of 25 CHF (average 
pay = 88 CHF, max pay = 113 CHF, min pay = 52 CHF).  
After participants had finished the behavioral paradigm (which lasted on average 11 
minutes and 45 seconds), we measured several beliefs that the participants held about the 
paradigm while the tDCS stimulation was still ongoing. This was done to control for any 
possible effects tDCS may have on the representation of knowledge about the task or the 
opponent reactions. For these measures, participants reported in standardized questionnaires their 
beliefs about a) how fair Player A considers a transfer of 0, 20, 40 or 60 per cent of the 
endowment to be, b) how angry Player B would be when receiving a transfer of 0, 20, 40 or 60 
percent and c) how strongly Player B would punish a transfer of 0, 20, 40 or 60 percent of the 
endowment. Responses to questionnaire a) and b) were given on a four-point scale ranging from 
“not at all” to “very”, whereas responses to questionnaire c) were given in terms of expected 
punishment in MUs. This latter measure corresponded to the deduction resulting from Player B’s 
response, e.g., 5*Y in Fig. 2B in the main paper.  
 
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) 
During the experiment, we applied tDCS over the participant’s rLPFC using a commercially 
available multi-channel stimulator that allows simultaneous stimulation of up to 16 participants 
with individually tailored stimulation protocols (see Fig. S2). tDCS modulates regional neural 
excitability by means of weak currents that increase or decrease the resting membrane potential, 
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depending on the position and polarity (anodal or cathodal) of the electrode. Thus, tDCS leads to 
an increase or decrease of the neural excitability in the brain tissue under the electrode (17, 34). 
In the present study, we applied anodal, cathodal, or sham tDCS over the right rLPFC region 
found activated in (10). The stimulation point was defined using the MNI coordinates reported 
by (10) as the group activation peak for the rLPFC region (x=52, y=28, z=14) that showed both 
heightened BOLD activity for punishment rounds minus baseline rounds as well as a correlation 
of individuals’ BOLD activity with their transfer difference between punishment and baseline 
rounds. This standard coordinate was transformed to the individual head-space of each 
participant using T1-weighted MR scans of participant’s neuroanatomy (T1-weighted 3D turbo 
field echo, 320 sagittal slices, matrix size: 240 x 240, voxel size = 1*1*0.6 mm, 8-channel head 
coil). The scalp coordinate overlying this brain area was employed as the center point for the 
target electrode and was determined for each participant prior to the experiment using Brainsight 
2.0 frameless stereotaxy.  
tDCS was applied using a set of standard 5x7 cm electrodes fixed by rubber straps. These 
standard electrodes were chosen over custom, more focal electrodes as we wanted to ensure that 
the large electrode would cover all neural rLPFC regions that are maximally active for each of 
our participants (minor variations in the precise spatial location of this area are averaged out 
during fMRI group analyses and are therefore likely to spread around the group peak used to 
define the stimulation site). The reference electrode (cathode for anodal tDCS and anode for 
cathodal tDCS) was positioned over the vertex, defined in the MR images as the scalp position 
overlying the confluence of each individual participant’s right and left central sulcus. This 
reference electrode position thus circumvented influences on other cortical areas potentially 
relevant for the top-down control of behavior (e.g., other prefrontal regions). Importantly, the 
fMRI analyses reported in (10) did not reveal any activation in the vicinity of this reference 
electrode (e.g., in parietal cortex or posterior midline structures). We could therefore be 
confident that the effects of tDCS on norm compliance would not be mediated by 
neuromodulatory influences on task-related neural activity under the reference electrode. The 
only difference between the anodal and the cathodal group was therefore whether the anodal or 
the cathodal electrode was positioned over the rLPFC.  
In line with established procedures, we stimulated with 1 mA current strength for the active 
anodal and cathodal groups. We accounted for possible delays in the onset of stable tDCS effects 
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(see (17, 35)) explicitly in our statistical analyses (see section “Analysis and Results” below). At 
the beginning of the stimulation the currents were slowly ramped up for 10 seconds to minimize 
tingling sensations caused by abrupt onsets of the tDCS. Likewise, when we finished brain 
stimulation the currents were slowly ramped down for 10 seconds. In the sham placebo group, 
the tDCS was turned off after 30 seconds. This latter condition feels identical to the active anodal 
and cathodal condition, but does not induce effects on neural excitability that outlast the 
stimulation period. The effects of the stimulation were indeed perceptually indistinguishable to 
the participants, as ascertained by a questionnaire conducted after the experiment in which the 
participants indicated how much they perceived the stimulation to affect their behavior (ranging 
from 1/”not at all” to 4/”extremely”). Participants in all three groups gave similar and 
statistically indistinguishable ratings (mean anodal: 1.42; mean sham: 1.30, mean cathodal: 1.55; 
F (2, 62) = 0.24, p = 0.79, ANOVA). Moreover, the different tDCS manipulations did not 
differentially affect the participants’ general emotional state, as measured by three subscales of a 
standardized questionnaire (MDBF) indexing mood, alertness, and calmness. These scales were 
measured at the beginning and end of the experiment, while participants were still being 
stimulated with tDCS. Neither were there any differences with respect to variables before the test 
(ANOVA, all F(2,60) < 0.34, all p > 0.71) nor did their changes from before to after the test 
differ between the tDCS groups (all F(2,60) < 1.64, all p > 0.2). Taken together, these control 
analyses therefore show that unspecific non-neural effects of tDCS on beliefs about stimulation 
or general emotional state cannot explain changes in norm compliance due to the brain 
stimulation.  
 
6 
 
 Ruff-Ugazio-Fehr supplementary online materials 
Analysis and Results 
The randomization worked well with respect to balancing the groups for socioeconomic and 
personality variables. We computed ANOVAs with the factors experiment (social vs non-social) 
and tDCS (anodal, cathodal, and sham) to compare the different groups across the various 
measures acquired during the initial online questionnaire. None of these analyses revealed any 
significant main effects or interactions (see Table S1), showing that the groups were well 
matched with respect to variables other than tDCS that may have affected punishment-induced 
norm compliance.  
Several participants had to be excluded from the analyses of their behavioral performance 
in the norm compliance paradigm as they evidently did not understand the task or chose to not 
participate in it. The criteria for this were: Failure to report answers within the response time of 
ten seconds on a majority of trials (11 participants) or stereotypical responses of not transferring 
any money on every single trial (7 participants). An additional participant in the cathodal group 
had to be excluded for moving the tDCS electrode during the experiment, resulting in abortion of 
stimulation while performing the task. This left 63 participants (19 anodal, 20 sham, and 24 
cathodal) in the final analyses for the social experiment and 59 participants (21 anodal, 18 sham 
and 20 cathodal) for the analysis of the non-social experiment.  
To assess the effects of anodal and cathodal brain stimulation on punishment-induced and 
voluntary norm compliance in the social experiment, we ran comprehensive generalized least-
squares (GLS) regression analyses in STATA version 12. These analyses predicted for each 
individual i the observed choice Ti,t in round t with the following equation:  
 
 Ti,t = β0 + β1*anodal + β2*cathodal + ηi + νt +εi,t  (eq. 1) 
  
For the analysis of voluntary norm compliance Ti,t is given by the transfers in the baseline 
rounds. For the analyses of sanction-induced norm compliance Ti,t is given by the difference 
between the transfers in the corresponding punishment and baseline rounds. Anodal and cathodal 
are dummy-coded variables that are set to 1 if individual i received anodal or cathodal 
stimulation, respectively, or to 0 in all other cases. Thus, the parameters β1 and β2 quantify the 
change in either voluntary or punishment-induced norm compliance due to anodal or cathodal 
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tDCS relative to the (omitted) sham group. The model furthermore contained a constant β0, 
which measures the average transfer or transfer difference in the sham condition, a time-invariant 
error term ηi capturing unobserved characteristics of each participant i, a time-specific error term 
νt capturing the effect that a specific time period t may have on transfers and transfers 
differences, and a residual error term εi,t. As the two independent variables anodal and cathodal 
are between-subject variables that vary only across individuals, we employed a random-effects 
model with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the subject level.  
As described in the main text, we find that anodal tDCS increases and cathodal tDCS 
decreases sanction-induced norm compliance and has opposite effects on voluntary norm 
compliance. These analyses focused on rounds 4-12 of the experiment, as it is well known from 
basic neurophysiological studies in humans (17) and mouse slice preparations (35) that the 
impact of tDCS on brain excitability becomes more robust and long-lasting after several minutes 
(this may possibly reflect delayed short-term neuroplastic processes occurring on top of 
immediate membrane potential changes; see (17, 35)). Thus, any corresponding behavioral 
effects of tDCS may also be expressed more profoundly several minutes after the onset of the 
tDCS. We accounted for this possible delay by focusing on rounds 4-12 which occurred after a 
minimum of 5 minutes after the onset of the tDCS and therefore lie fully in the temporal window 
where tDCS exerts lasting neurophysiological effects (see (17, 35)). However, we ensured that 
the precise cut-off points for including periods into the analyses did not affect the results, by 
conducting control analyses in which we also included data from earlier periods, or where the 
cutoff point for inclusion was moved to later periods. Table S2 and S3 show that very similar 
tDCS effects are obtained if we include previous periods or start the analysis at later periods. 
This shows that the changes in sanction-induced and voluntary norm compliance resulting from 
tDCS are temporally robust and do not depend on the particular time window (periods 4-12) we 
have chosen.  
As the critical comparison between the three tDCS conditions comprised different groups 
of participants, one may wonder whether possible differences in the personality of the 
participants may have contributed to the group differences in sanction-induced norm compliance. 
Table S1 already shows that this scenario is very unlikely, as such personality variables did not 
differ between the three tDCS groups due to our strict randomization procedures. We 
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nevertheless directly controlled for these personality variables in our statistical analysis, by 
repeating the regression model given in eq.1, but now adding all personality variables given in 
Table S1 as additional regressors. This control analysis revealed very similar parameter estimates 
and significance levels for the effects of anodal (sanction-induced norm compliance: 9.9282., 
p<0.0001; voluntary norm compliance: -7.97, p < 0.0001) and cathodal (sanction-induced norm 
compliance: -8.128, p<0.0001; voluntary norm compliance: 3.028, p < 0.024) tDCS. This 
demonstrates that it was indeed the tDCS – and not any possible (non-significant) differences in 
personality characteristics – that led to different levels of sanction-induced and voluntary norm 
compliance in the different groups.  
The results so far show that tDCS of rLPFC affected sanction-induced and voluntary norm 
compliance, but they do not yet show whether these effects relate specifically to the social 
dimension of the interaction. This question appears somewhat irrelevant for our findings on 
voluntary norm compliance, as fairness norms prescribing voluntary sharing of money only exist 
for social interactions with other humans. However, this question is relevant for understanding 
the tDCS effects on sanction-induced norm compliance, as transfer decisions in the punishment 
condition do not only require social/normative considerations. For instance, transfer choices in 
this condition require both the assessment of the risk of being punished as well as the evaluation 
of the trade-off between selfish gains from low tranfers and the associated loss from possible 
punishment; any tDCS effect on such generic decision processes may influence behavioral 
reactions to sanction threats independently of the social nature of the punishment. To examine 
whether the reported tDCS effects on sanction-induced norm compliance are indeed specific to 
the social context, we therefore repeated the experiment in a new sample of participants who 
participated in the same economic game as before, but now played against a computer that was 
pre-programmed to respond to the transfers in the same way as a human opponent. For this 
purpose, we determined the computer’s response on every trial by a random draw from the actual 
distributions of punishment choices from the first experiment for a given transfer. Adding these 
data to the regression model specified in eq.1 yields the following full model:  
 
Ti,t = β0 + β1*anodal + β2*cathodal + β3*non-social + β4*anodal*non-social + β5*cathodal*non-
social + ηi + νt +εi,t                    (eq. 2) 
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The variable “non-social” is dummy-coded, i.e., it is set to 1 if participant i played against a 
computer and 0 if she played against a human player. Thus, the crucial parameters β4 and β5 
specify how the tDCS-effects on sanction-induced norm compliance change when participants 
are faced with a computer rather than a real person. All other variables are coded in the same 
way as in eq. 1. The regression results for model (2) are given in Table S3. Crucially, the 
significant interaction parameters β4 and β5 show that the effects of social sanction threats on 
norm compliance were indeed much stronger than the corresponding effects in the nonsocial 
experiment, with anodal tDCS leading to a stronger increase and cathodal tDCS to a stronger 
decrease in sanction-induced norm compliance. Again, these effects were robust across different 
time windows of the experiment and were unaffected when controlling for potential effects of 
personality variables in the statistical model. Taken together, these analyses demonstrate that the 
rLPFC indeed plays a specific role in integrating the social dimension of possible sanctions into 
behavioral control based on social norms.  
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Figure S1. Behavioral paradigm. Schematics of the visual displays used for the experimental 
task in a punishment round (A) or baseline round (B). Participants were first informed by means 
of a visual cue (presented for 5 seconds) whether punishment was possible or not. This was 
indicated by the numbers 5:1 (as in panel A, specifying that each punishment point invested by B 
reduced Player A’s monetary payoff by 5 points) or 0:0 (as in panel B, no points could be 
invested by B and deducted from A). This was followed by a bar stimulus (presented for 10 
seconds) used by Player A to indicate the designated transfer, by moving a computer mouse to 
the corresponding position and confirming the selection by mouse click. The length of the white 
bar indicated the portion of the 100 MUs Player A wanted to keep for herself, whereas the length 
of the black bar indicated the transferred amount (these choices were also displayed numerically 
at the left and right end of the bar). For example, in the left figure above Player A kept 70 MUs 
for herself and transferred 30 to Player B. The 25 MUs given to Players A and B were also 
displayed as separate sections of these bars on either end that could not be altered by player A’s 
choice. Following a break of 5 seconds in which player B’s choice was determined, the final 
outcome was revealed. In the baseline trials, this corresponded to the proposed split, whereas in 
punishment rounds, the money deducted from both Player A and B as a consequence of Player 
B’s punishment choice was displayed, by overlaying a grey bar over the white and black bars 
indicating Player A’s and B’s payoffs. The size of this bar corresponded to the amount of 
punishment B decided to impose on A following the 5:1 punishment ratio. The final outcome of 
the interaction was thus displayed in the re-sized white bar (for Player A) and black bar (for 
Player B). For example, in the left figure above, after Player A chose a 70:30 split of the 100 
MUs, Player B invested 14 into punishment which led to a final payoff of 41 for B. The sanction 
imposed by B reduced A’s payoff by 5*14 = 70 MUs, leaving A with a final payoff of 25MUs.  
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Figure S2. tDCS Setup.  
All testing was conducted in sessions with 12 participants (except when not all invited 
participants showed up) who were randomly and evenly sorted into the three stimulation 
conditions (4 anodal, 4 cathodal, and 4 sham) in a double-blind design. Participants were seated 
in a group laboratory, each facing an identical computer workstation that was shielded from the 
other players’ view. tDCS was employed via a multi-channel tDCS stimulator that can apply 
individualized electric current stimulation protocols to the brain of each volunteer (see text). This 
parallel testing regime has the advantage that many unspecific testing effects (e.g. time of day, 
experimenter, etc.) are identical for the different stimulation groups.  
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Figure S3. Anodal tDCS increases and cathodal tDCS decreases transfers in punishment 
rounds. The bars depict Player A’s average transfers (+/- s.e.m.) across all punishment rounds. 
Note, however, that the effect of sanction threats on norm compliance can only be accurately 
quantified for each individual in relation to her level of voluntary norm compliance in the 
baseline rounds. The individual transfer difference between punishment and baseline rounds 
(Fig. 2A) is therefore used as index of sanction-induced norm compliance. All values determined 
with regression in eq. 1; * p < 0.05.  
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Figure S4. tDCS effects on sanction-induced and voluntary transfers are more pronounced 
in the social context than in the non-social context. (A) The bars depict Player A’s average 
transfer difference (+/- s.e.m.) between punishment and baseline rounds. Positive values indicate 
higher transfers when sanction threats are present. In the non-social context, participants were 
clearly also sensitive to punishment threats (as indicated by the large positive values), but the 
effect of tDCS on sanction-induced transfers (difference between the three bars in different 
colors) was much weaker than in the social context; see Fig. 4 and main text for direct 
comparison and statistics. All values determined with regression in eq. 2. (B) The bars depict 
Player A’s average transfer (+/- s.e.m.) in baseline rounds. In the non-social context, participants 
hardly transferred any MUs to the computer opponent, whereas in the social context, they 
voluntarily transferred MUs to the anonymous human opponent. Again, the effect of tDCS on 
voluntary transfers (difference between the three bars in different colors) was more pronounced 
in the social context; see Fig. 4 and main text for direct comparison and statistics. All values 
determined with regression in eq. 2. 
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Table S1: Summary of statistics testing for possible stimulation group differences in 
variables that may have affected sanction-induced norm compliance. We compared scores 
on several personality scales measuring Machiavellian thinking, risk attitudes (Dospert scale), 
empathy (Davis scale), and anxiety (STAI) for participants in the social experiment (with human 
opponents) and the non-social experiment (with computer opponents). For this purpose, we 
conducted ANOVAs with the independent variables tDCS (3 levels: anodal, sham, and cathodal) 
and experiment/context (2 levels: social and non-social experiment/context). This revealed that 
the groups did not differ in any of these variables, making it unlikely that differences in 
personality variables could account for the effects of tDCS on sanction-induced and voluntary 
norm compliance.  
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 Periods 1-12 Periods 2-12 Periods 3-12 Periods 4-12 Periods 5-12 Periods 6-12 Periods 7-12 
Regressor Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value 
Andoal 7.204 0.0001 8.126 0.0001 9.24 0.0001 9.854 0.0001 9.539 0.0001 9.431 0.0001 9.873 0.0001 
Cathodal -6.253 0.0001 -6.471 0.0001 -6.321 0.0001 -6.691 0.0001 -6.67 0.0001 -7.105 0.0001 -6.602 0.0001 
Constant 28.8 0 29.28 0 29.28 0 29.44 0 29.93 0 30.4 0 30.37 0 
 
 
Table S2: Sanction-induced norm compliance: Summary statistics for the GLS regression 
given in eq. 1. The analysis estimates the impact of anodal and cathodal stimulation on transfer 
difference between punishment and baseline rounds across different time windows. To ensure 
that we capture the time window during which tDCS exerts lasting neurophysiological effects we 
concentrate our analysis in the paper on periods 4-12. Here we show the regression coefficients 
for our tDCS effects (anodal, cathodal) for larger and smaller time windows around our preferred 
window (4-12). The effects remain stable and significant across all the above time windows, 
indicating temporally robust effects of tDCS on behavior.  
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  Periods 1-12 Periods 2-12 Periods 3-12 Periods 4-12 Periods 5-12 Periods 6-12 Periods 7-12 
Regressor Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value 
Andoal -3.303 0.001 -4.072 0.001 -4.732 0.001 -4.805 0.001 -4.739 0.001 -4.333 0.001 -4.35 0.001 
Cathodal 1.549 0.0423 2.030 0.0977 2.150 0.053 2.870 0.0093 2.635 0.0257 3.107 0.0118 3.167 0.02 
Constant 10.42 0.001 15.55 0.001 15.10 0.001 14.72 0.001 14.5 0.001 14.21 0.001 4.048 0.001 
 
 
Table S3: Voluntary norm compliance: Summary statistics for the GLS regression given in 
eq. 1. The analysis estimates the impact of anodal and cathodal stimulation on voluntary 
transfers in baseline rounds across different time windows. We again report this analysis in the 
paper for periods 4-12 to account for possible delays in the onset of stable neurophysiological 
effects due to tDCS. Here we show the regression coefficients for our treatment effects (anodal, 
cathodal) for larger and smaller time windows around our preferred window (4-12). The effects 
remain stable and significant across all the above time windows, indicating temporally robust 
effects of tDCS on behavior.  
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  Periods 1-12 Periods 2-12 Periods 3-12 Periods 4-12 Periods 5-12 Periods 6-12 Periods 7-12 
Regressor Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value Coeff. P Value 
Andoal 7.209 0.0001 8.130 0.0001 9.243 0.0001 9.859 0.0001 9.543 0.0001 9.435 0.0001 9.873 0.0001 
Cathodal -6.255 0.0001 -6.471 0.0001 -6.321 0.0001 -6.691 0.0001 -6.67 0.0001 -7.105 0.0001 -6.602 0.0001 
Non-Social 9.981 0.0001 10.31 0.0001 10.2 0.0001 10.45 0.0001 9.712 0.0001 9.535 0.0001 9.709 0.0001 
Anodal*Non-Social -1.628 0.424 -2.603 0.1650 -4.011 0.0490 -5.009 0.0091 -4.452 0.038 -5.013 0.0397 -5.670 0.0246 
Cathodal*Non-Social 8.061 0.0001 7.530 0.0002 7.445 0.0005 7.686 0.0005 8.277 0.0002 8.601 0.0003 7.356 0.0036 
 
 
Table S4. Summary statistics for the GLS regression in eq. 2 that estimates whether the 
impact of anodal and cathodal stimulation on sanction-induced norm compliance is 
stronger in the social context than in the non-social context. The significant interaction terms 
confirm that tDCS effects on sanction-induced norm compliance were indeed stronger during 
social interactions with a human opponent. Again, we performed these analyses for various time 
windows to account for possible delays in neurophysiological tDCS effects. Except for the 
inclusion of the first two periods, the interaction effect is always significant for anodal 
stimulation, suggesting that the effect builds up over time; for cathodal stimulation is it even 
significant if we include the first two periods in the analyses.  
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